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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintif£'Appellant Silicon International Ore, LLC ("SIO") submits this brief in
support of its appeal from the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendants
Monsanto Company ("Monsanto") and Washington Group International, Inc., ("WGI''), as well
as a related evidentiary ruling. SIO and Monsanto entered into a contract that permitted SIO to
build and operate a silica sand processing facility on Monsanto's Soda Springs, Idaho mineral
quarry. The contract between SIO and Monsanto contemplated that it would remain in effect so
long as it was mutually beneficial to both SIO and Monsanto, and it defined the parameters of
what "mutual benefit" meant. WGI was a contractor whose role, at least relative to this
transaction, was to facilitate SIO's operations on the Monsanto quarry. Monsanto breached its
agreement with SIO by, without limitation, forcing SIO to cease its operations and to vacate the
quarry, despite SIO's satisfaction of all the terms of its contract with Monsanto. WGI
intentionally interfered with SIO's operations on the quarry and breached the implied covenant
of good faith inhering in its own services agreement.
SIO commenced this lawsuit and asserted claims against both Monsanto and
WGI, which, after discovery, sought summary judgment. The district court excluded from its
summary judgment consideration an email from a then-Monsanto representative specifying the
terms of the SIO/Monsanto contract. The district court awarded both Monsanto and WGI
summary judgment, together with attorney fees and costs.

1
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II.
A.

STATEMENT OF FACTS 1

The Initial Relationship Between Monsanto and WGI
On or about March 10, 1993, WGI (then known as Conda Mining Inc.) and

Monsanto entered into an agreement called the "First Quartzite Agreement." R. at 473. Pursuant
to the First Quartzite Agreement, WGI agreed to perform certain services as a contract miner for
Monsanto upon Monsanto's Soda Springs, Idaho mineral quarry (the "Quarry"), including to
"mine, crush and screen, at the Quarry, quartzite," to "remove overburden," to "maintain and
operate ... such quartzite belt or other stacking system," and to perform other services. R. at
474-76. Nothing in the First Quartzite Agreement contemplates the sale of any sand from
Monsanto to WGI, the passing of any title to any sand from Monsanto to WGI, the conveyance
of any real property pertaining to the Quarry from Monsanto to WGI, or WGI's sale of any sand
mined at the Quarry.
B.

SIO's Contract with Monsanto
In approximately 1999 or early 2000, SIO commenced negotiations with

Monsanto to purchase silica sand from the Quarry for processing and sale by SIO. R. at 438.
Mitchell Hart ("Hart"), of Monsanto, was the "point contact" between Monsanto and SIO in
those negotiations. R. at 510. Those negotiations culminated in an agreement between SIO and
Monsanto, with Hart confirming the terms of the agreement on behalf of Monsanto. The terms
of that agreement were as follows:

1

All evidence summarized in this section is located in the summary judgment record
before the district court.

2
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a.

b.

c.
d.
e.

Monsanto would furnish SIO with certain agreed-upon quantities of
sand that could be processed and improved in a safe and environmentally
sound manner.
Although SIO could sell improved, value-added sand to third parties,
Monsanto reserved the right to limit the markets in which SIO could sell
improved sand.
SIO could extract sand from designated locations on the Quarry premises.
SIO would pay Monsanto royalties in agreed-upon amounts.
The agreement would remain in full force and effect for so long as it was
mutually beneficial to both SIO and Monsanto to operate in accordance
with the agreement. Both SIO and Monsanto understood and agreed that
"mutual benefit" would be assessed in accordance with the following
criteria: (1) SIO conformed to all of Monsanto's environmental, safety,
and control regulations; (2) SIO paid Monsanto agreed-upon royalty
payments; and (3) SIO permitted Monsanto to reasonably control the
markets in which SIO could sell improved sand. So long as those criteria
were satisfied, Monsanto would continue to provide agreed-upon
quantities of sand and permit SIO to extract and sell improved sand
obtained from the Quarry.

R. at 438-39. In an email Hart sent to Todd Sullivan, of SIO, years after the creation of the SIOMonsanto Agreement, Hart confirmed his recollection as to the "intent of the Monsanto-SIO
relationship" as follows:
a.
b.

c.

d.

"Monsanto had determined that 'sand' was not a 'core business' for
Monsanto";
"If the by-product reject sand at the Monsanto quartzite quarry could be
sold as-is, Monsanto would be interested in taking the lead in those types
of sales because it would require little effort and manpower";
"Monsanto viewed a relationship with someone like SIO of value if they
could assure themselves that any value added operation would be run in a
way that would meet all Monsanto environmental, safety and health
standards"; and
"If Monsanto provided sand to a 'third party' for them to process and add
value to the sand and if they could receive a royalty that would be of
similar value to just selling sand as-is was viewed as a potentially
attractive business relationship."

3
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R. at 439, 443-46. In that same email, Hart confirmed that "in the early 2000s a contractual
relationship was established (or extended) between Monsanto and SIO" with the following
terms:
a.
b.
c.

"Monsanto would receive a royalty from SIO (for similar value as if they
would have sold raw sand)";
"Monsanto would assure SIO certain volumes of sand that could be safely
and environmentally processed to meet value added markets"; and
SIO would be limited to a specific list of value added markets-such as
fiberglass, traction, water jet media, etc."

R. at 439, 445-46. Hart further confirmed that "Monsanto viewed SIO as a means to move value
added sand into value added markets without having to put up the capital and worry about the
day to day operational issues." R. at 439, 445-46. Hart spent approximately thirty minutes
writing this email, and it took him, in total, "two days to write it and formulate[] [his thoughts],
[sit] down and put them on paper." R. at 513.
Almost two months later, on March 6, 2008, in response to a follow-up telephone
call from Todd Sullivan, Hart wrote the following email to Todd Sullivan regarding the term of
the SIO-Monsanto agreement:
As per your request, I can comfortably state the following with regard to the
agreements entered into and between Monsanto and Silicon International Ore.
The basis of those agreements was:
• An overall mutually beneficial arrangement
• Terms, conditions and expectations that each side was expected to fulfill
• Term and termination clauses that would allow specified review periods to
assess performance by each party
As long as the terms, conditions and expectations were met, I had assumed that
the agreements would continue to go forward in a mutually beneficial way unless
there was cause for a "parting of the ways."

4
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R. at 439, 445-46. Hart specifically used the word "comfortably" to describe his testimony
because he perceived that Todd Sullivan was somehow asking him to "do something that [he]
wasn't comfortable with," and that Hart "got the sense that [Todd Sullivan] was pressuring [him]
to remember things in a way that [he] wasn't totally comfortable with." R. at 513. In fact,
Hart's March 6, 2008, email to Todd Sullivan "represents ... a little bit of push back to what
Todd Sullivan was asking [him] to do." R. at 513.
Subsequently, on March 14, 2008, Todd Sullivan asked Hart to confirm the
accuracy of the following statement:
In conversations and emails I have had with Mitch Hart, we both concur
that an agreement exists between Monsanto and Silicon International Ore in that
Monsanto represented to us that we would be allowed to continue to operate as
long as it was mutually beneficial for us to do so. Meaning that we would be
required to conform to all of Monsanto's environmental, safety and control
regulations, provide Monsanto with royalty payments that would more than offset
any costs Monsanto might incur from our operation, and allow Monsanto to
reasonably control which markets we were able to sell to.
Monsanto would in tum assure us certain volumes of sand and allow us to
continue to operate the business. Washington Group International was brought
into the mix to help facilitate this agreement.
R. at 439, 447-48. In an email response sent that same day, Hart called this statement "a fair
representation of our discussions and emails." R. at 447. In his deposition, Hart admitted that
the statements contained in his affidavit (filed with the district court in connection with
Monsanto's motion for summary judgment) were the product of a conversation with Monsanto's
counsel. R. at 239 (affidavit). According to Hart, he "recall[s] that he reviewed documents" in
preparing his affidavit, but he does not remember specifically which ones, and he confirmed that

5
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he did not "review any quartzite agreements or addenda between Monsanto and WGL" He also
does not recall reviewing any emails or letters. The only people Hart spoke with to prepare his
affidavit were Monsanto's counsel; he did not speak with anyone else. R. at 517-19.
On or about December 19, 2000, Bob Sullivan, of SIO, sent Hart a letter stating
that SIO was "pleased that the intent" behind SIO's arrangement with Monsanto "seems to be a
long-term relationship." R. at 444. Neither Hart nor anyone else at Monsanto ever corrected,
qualified, or even responded to Bob Sullivan's reference to a "long-term relationship" between
SIO and Monsanto. R. at 439-40. In late 2000, Todd Sullivan orally requested that Hart
confirm that Monsanto would not abruptly terminate its agreement with SIO. In response, Hart
provided that assurance. R. at 440. But for Hart's representations, SIO would never have
invested the funds that it did into the silica quarry business, or entered into any relationship, of
any kind, with WGI or Monsanto. R. at 440.
Monsanto was interested in having SIO sell value-added sand from Monsanto's
Quarry because, in Hart's words:
But, more importantly, is that in the process-in the quartzite process they crush
and screen the material and generate a large volume of material that they have to
backfill and stockpile. And because of the limits or the boundaries of their quarry
operation, they were running out of-they, we, were running out of room to put
the material.
And so looking at opportunities to develop a market for that material
would delay the need to purchase any land or buffer zone around. So that was
probably as important or more important at the time than making any money off
the material.

R. at 508.

6
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C.

WGl's and Monsanto's Subsequent Contractual Arrangements in Response
to the SIO/Monsanto Contract
On or about November 29, 2000, WGI and Monsanto executed an Addendum to

First Quartzite Agreement (the "First Addendum"). R. at 527. The First Addendum provides
that WGI "may construct, maintain, and operate a silica sand processing facility ... to be located
at the Northeast comer of Monsanto's property at the quarry." R. at 527. It further provides that
WGI "shall pay a royalty to Monsanto of $13.00 per ton of finished silica sand product sold by
[WGI] to a third party or used by [WGI] in activity unrelated to the Facility." R. at 527-28.
Additionally, it provides that WGI "anticipates entering into one or more contracts with [SIO]
related to the financing, construction, operation, and ownership of the equipment and building
for the silica sand processing facility." R. at 528.
On or about December 1, 2000, SIO and WGI executed a contract called the
Master Agreement (the "Master Agreement"). R. at 450. Nowhere does the Master Agreement
contemplate a sale of any sand from WGI to SIO. Rather, the Master Agreement contemplates
payment by SIO to WGI for "design and permitting services"; "costs and expenses associated
with procurement of supplies for, and construction of, the Facility"; "installation, operation, and
maintenance of [SIO's] equipment"; and "a fee per ton which includes [Monsanto's] royalty fee,
as set forth in Exhibit A." R. at 450-52. The Master Agreement stops short of calling the
transfer of sand, "a sale of sand by WGI to SIO," stating instead that WGI will "supply to [SIO]
a portion of the silica sand within its control and produced at its project site." R. at 450. WGI

7
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was nothing more than a "contractor" for Monsanto, in that "Monsanto owns the quartzite. WGI
mines it, crushes, washes it, and delivers it to the plant." R. at 622.
On or about September 24, 2001, WGI and Monsanto 2 entered into a Second
Quartzite Agreement (the "Second Quartzite Agreement"). R. at 529. The Second Quartzite
Agreement summarizes the same obligations as the First Quartzite Agreement. R. at 529.
Again, nothing in the Second Quartzite Agreement contemplates the sale of any sand from
Monsanto to WGI, the passing of any title to any sand from Monsanto to WGI, the conveyance
of any real property pertaining to the Quarry from Monsanto to WGI, or WGI's sale of any sand
mined at the Quarry. R. at 529. The Second Quartzite Agreement recites an expiration date of
December 31, 2007. R. at 532.
On or about March 1, 2002, WGI and Monsanto entered into an addendum to the
Second Quartzite Agreement (the "Second Addendum"). R. at 564. The Second Addendum
differs from the Addendum to First Quartzite Agreement in that it (1) provides that WGI may
maintain "a silica sand processing facility" specifically on behalf of SIO; (2) contemplates that
SIO, not WGI, will be the seller of processed sand; (3) contemplates a royalty structure based on
sand sold by SIO; and (4) clarifies that "[t]itle to silica sand sold by SIO shall pass directly from
[Monsanto] to SIO upon processing by the Facility, subject to payment of royalty hereunder." R.
at 564-65. Monsanto owns the real estate upon which the Quarry sits. R. at 585.

2

The Second Quartzite Agreement is actually between WGI and P4 Production, LLC,
which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Monsanto.

8
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D.

The Performance of the SIO/Monsanto Contract
In a letter dated December 2, 2002, from Monsanto to WGI, Jim Smith, of

Monsanto, set forth royalty amounts that he stated "represent[ ed] royalties "agreed to by [SIO] as
fair and reasonable and accepted by [Monsanto]." R. at 656. John Rosenbaum ('.'Rosenbaum"),
a former WGI representative, testified as follows regarding how SIO paid royalty amounts:
Q.
As far as the payment of royalties, how would that work in
practice? Walk me through the process of how royalties would be calculated
and paid.
A.
All the product that left the site was weighed by the truckload, and
it was calculated and paid on tons.
Q.
Who paid-let me back up. Did SIO pay the royalty first?
A.
They paid it to Washington.
Q.
What specifically did SIO pay to Washington? They paid a
royalty, did they pay anything else?
A.
Yes, they paid for our services.
Q.
When Washington received payment from SIO, did that come
in the form of separate checks for different types of payment or in one lump
sum check?
A.
I can't remember whether there was multiple checks or not.
Q.
When WGI received this payment from SIO, did it then turn
around and pay a portion of that to Monsanto?
A.
We paid royalties to Monsanto, yes.
R. at 649. He further testified that he was present at, and remembered, meetings between SIO,
WGI, and Monsanto regarding, among other things, royalty amounts. According to Rosenbaum,
SIO and Monsanto were the entities making proposals for royalty amounts; Rosenbaum could
not "say one way or the other" whether WGI made any proposals for royalty amounts, but he
"knew" that SIO and Monsanto did. R. at 650.
SIO paid regular, significant royalty payments in this manner-it would send funds to
WGI sufficient to compensate it for its services, as well as additional funds that SIO understood

9
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that WGI would then pass on to Monsanto as Monsanto's royalty for the sold sand. R. at 441.
Regarding the amount of royalties SIO paid, in a meeting held on March 7, 2002, SIO, WGI, and
Monsanto agreed that the Monsanto-WGI written agreement would reflect a royalty matrix
consistent with the matrix SIO submitted; WGI was to "in tum update [its] agreement with SIO
to parallel" the Monsanto-WGI agreement. R. at 464-66.
Monsanto was concerned with, and controlled, SIO's ability to sell sand into
certain markets. At the outset of Monsanto's dealings with SIO, Bob Sullivan sent Hart a
facsimile transmission summarizing SIO 's proposed markets and uses. R. at 461-63. In the
previously-mentioned March 7, 2002, meeting, SIO, WGI, and Monsanto discussed and agreed
upon certain markets into which SIO could sell sand. R. at 441-464-66. Monsanto specifically
wished to ensure that it did not enter into any agreement that "conflict[ ed] with" other sand
supply agreements "either in pricing or supply type of material, point of use, type of use."
Specifically, "Monsanto knew that the ultimate marketer" of the sand" was "SIO, and in order to
ensure that the material was used in the proper uses, [Monsanto] required [SIO] to seek ...
approval" from SIO prior to selling into any markets not approved by Monsanto. R. at 632.

E.

WGI's Conduct Relative to SIO's Operations at the Quarry
WGI undermined SIO's work on the Quarry in a number of ways. R. at 703-08.

Among other ways, on a prior project, WGI had built a wash screen for another entity by simply
and inexpensively modifying an existing screen. R. at 703-05. When SIO approached WGI to
request that it modify a screen in the same manner, WGI refused, but ultimately relented and

10
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commenced building a screen that cost between $125,000 and $150,000-amounts that SIO did
not, and otherwise would not, have had to pay. R. at 703-05.
F.

Monsanto's Breach of the SIO/Monsanto Contract

On December 30, 2007, SIO received a letter from WGI requiring SIO to leave
the Quarry premises. At the time SIO received that letter, SIO had received no notice from WGI
that it intended to conclude its relationship with SIO. Indeed, because the Master Agreement's
term had elapsed over two years prior to the letter, SIO and its principals understood that its
relationship with WGI would proceed indefinitely, like the SIG-Monsanto agreement. R. at 442.
In fact, prior to receiving WGI's termination letter, SIO and WGI had scheduled, for midJanuary 2008, a meeting to discuss SIO's and WGI's ongoing relationship. R. at 442.
In April 2008, months after WGI sent its termination letter to SIO, Monsanto
confirmed to SIO that it indeed no longer would permit SIO to operate on the Quarry. Again,
other than WGI's tennination letter, SIO received no notice from Monsanto, at least until then,
that it intended to conclude its relationship with SIO. R. at 442.
III.

1.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment in favor of

Monsanto on SIO's claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, where the record on summary judgment contained unequivocal evidence of
an enforceable contract between Monsanto and SIO which was not, by its terms, subject to the
statute of frauds?
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2.

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment in favor of

Monsanto on SIO's claims for equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel, when the record on
summary judgment contained unequivocal evidence of representations Monsanto made to SIO to
induce it to construct its silica processing facility on the Monsanto quarry, and where Monsanto
did not even seek summary judgment on those claims?
3.

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment in favor of WGI

on SIO's claim for tortious interference with contract, where the district court sua sponte relied
upon an argument not briefed by either party and not relied upon on at oral argument, and where
the record on summary judgment revealed WGI's awareness of SIO's contract with Monsanto?
4.

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment in favor of WGI

on SIO's claim for breach of the implied covenant, where the record on summary judgment
identifies damages specifically arising from WGI's breach of the implied covenant inhering in
the Master Agreement?
5.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by excluding Hart's March 14,

2008, email from its summary judgment consideration?
IV.

ST AND ARD OF REVIEW

"In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court's standard of
review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment." Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 525, 96 P.3d 623, 626 (2004).
"Appellate courts review issues of whether to admit or exclude evidence under an
abuse of discretion standard." Slack v. Kelleher, 140 Idaho 916, 925, 104 P.2d 958, 966 (2004).
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"Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is affected." I.R.E. 103(a).
V.

ARGUMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate "only if the evidence in the record and any
admissions show that there is no genuine issue of any material fact regarding the issues raised in
the pleadings and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In/anger v.

City ofSalmon, 137 Idaho 45, 46-47, 44 P.3d 1100, 1101-02 (2002) (emphasis added); see also
Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). For at least two reasons, summary judgment is, by design, difficult to
obtain.
First, on summary judgment, "[t]he burden of proving the absence of a material
fact rests at all times upon the moving party." See Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867
P.2d 960, 963 (1994). "If the moving party fails to challenge an element or fails to present
evidence establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on that element, the burden
does not shift to the nonmoving party, and the nonmoving party is not required to respond with
supporting evidence." Smith v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 719, 918 P.2d
583, 588 (1996). It is only where the moving party successfully challenges an element of the
nonmoving party's case that the burden "shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with
sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact." See id.
Second, a "genuine issue of material fact" exists when "one may draw conflicting
inferences" from the evidence, and "ifreasonable people might reach different conclusions." See

Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408, 410-11, 179 P.3d 1064, 1066-67 (2008);
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see also Northwest Bee-Corp. v. Home Living Serv., 136 Idaho 835, 838, 41 P.3d 263, 266
(2002) ("Summary judgment must be denied ifreasonable persons could reach differing
conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented."). On summary
judgment, courts may not weigh conflicting evidence, nor may they assess the credibility of
witnesses. See Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117,
127-28, 206 P.3d 481, 491-92 (2009); see also First Sec. Bank, NA. v. Murphy, 131Idaho787,
792, 964 P.2d 654, 659 (1998) (rejecting an approach where the district court made, on summary
judgment, "a credibility determination and weighed the evidence presented on the summary
judgment motions"). Additionally, district courts on summary judgment must "liberally construe
all facts in favor of the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences from the facts in
favor of the nonmoving party." See Northwest Bee-Corp., 136 Idaho at 838, 41 P.3d at 266.
"[C]ircumstantial evidence may suffice" to identify a disputed issue of material fact and to defeat
a motion for summary judgment. See Banner, 147 Idaho at 123, 206 P.3d at 487.
Critically, on appeal, this Court applies the same standards when reviewing a
grant of summary judgment. See Estate of Becker, 140 Idaho at 525, 96 P.3d at 626. When
viewed with clarity through that lens, the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of
Monsanto and WGI is erroneous and must be reversed.

A.

The District Court Erred by Awarding Monsanto Summary Judgment on
SI O's Claims for Breach of Contract and Breach of the Implied Covenant.
1.

The Statute of Frauds Does Not Bar SIO's Breach of Contract Claim.

The district court granted summary judgment on SIO's claim for breach of
contract on the sole ground that the statute of frauds required the contract to be in writing. R. at
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786-89. 3 In so ruling, the district court characterized the contract as being solely for the sale of
goods for $500.00 or more. R. at 786-89. The district court also concluded that Monsanto's
performance of the contract, in the form of its receipt of payments pursuant to the contract, did
not remove the contract from the statute of frauds. R. at 786-89. Neither of those grounds is
correct.
Idaho Code§ 28-2-201 (1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, a contract for the sale of goods for
the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless
there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made
between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought
or by his authorized agent or broker. ...
(Emphasis added.) The record on summary judgment was that SIO's contract with Monsanto
was not a contract for the sale of goods for $500.00 or more. 4 Rather, the overwhelming
evidence on summary judgment was that the contract defined an ongoing, mutually beneficial
business relationship whereby Monsanto would permit SIO to build and operate a silica
processing plant upon the Quarry, would grant SIO the access required to operate the plant,
would furnish SIO sand in quantities sufficient for it to meet its business needs, and would
permit SIO to sell sand refined at its plant. R. at 438-39, 443-46 . In return, Monsanto required

3

Specifically, the district court noted that "there are very likely triable issues of fact
which would preclude summary judgment with regard to Monsanto's other asserted basis for
summary judgment, i.e., vagueness, uncertainty of terms and no provable damages." R. at 786.
The district court also expressly "limited its decision on summary judgment to a finding that
SIO's oral contract, if in fact one exists, is unenforceable pursuant to LC. § 28-2-201." R. at
793.
4

SIO argued this in the district court. R. at 384; Tr. of May 13, 2011, Hrg. at 45-46.
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that its environmental, safety, and control requirements be met, that it be permitted to control the
markets in which SIO ultimately sold process sand, and that SIO pay Monsanto a royalty based
on quantities of sand that SIO sold. R. at 438-39, 443--46. So long as SIO met those
requirements, and so long as SIO paid Monsanto an agreed-upon royalty for sand SIO sold,
Monsanto would allow SIO to continue operating in this manner. R. at 438-39, 443--46. SIO's
mere work upon the quarry premises benefitted Monsanto, as SIO's operations assisted
Monsanto in disposing of a waste product that, at some point, Monsanto was going to have to
dispose of. R. at 508. Making money off the sand delivered to Monsanto was not even
Monsanto's primary concern. R. at 508.
In other words, based on the evidence before the district court, the SIO/Monsanto
contract does not, at its heart, concern the sale of sand. It is a contract permitting SIO to operate
a business upon Monsanto's Quarry so long as SIO satisfied Monsanto's safety, environmental,
and control regulations, so long as SIO permitted Monsanto to control the markets into which it
sold processed sand, and so long as SIO paid Monsanto a royalty based on quantities of
processed sand that SIO sold. The type of business operated on the Quarry is inseparable from
the Quarry itself, as SIO would have little reason to operate on Monsanto's Quarry if it was not
processing Monsanto's sand. Based on the totality of the evidence before the district court, there
was ample evidence that the SIO/Monsanto contract was not a contract for the sale of goods.
This case is totally distinct from the types of cases in which Idaho courts have found§ 28-2-201
applicable. See, e.g., Keller Lorenz Co. v. Ins. Assocs. Corp., 98 Idaho 678, 684, 570 P.2d 1366,
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1372 (1977) (sale of a truck); D.R. Curtis Co. v. Mason, 103 Idaho 476, 476, 649 P.2d 1232,
1232 (Ct. App. 1982) (sale of bushels of spring wheat).
Critically, despite the SIO/Monsanto contract's contemplation of a royalty based
on the quantity of finished sand SIO sold, that does not make the contract one for the "sale" of
goods for $500.00 or more. The evidence before the district court on summary judgment was
that Monsanto did not sell sand to SIO, but that it merely furnished sufficient sand to SIO, which
processed and sold that sand and paid Monsanto a royalty based on the quantity of processed
sand that SIO sold. R. at 464-66, 564-68, 649 . SIO's contract with Monsanto was not defined
by the price of sand sold, per quantity, by Monsanto to SIO as with the sale of goods. Most
importantly, SIO did not pay Monsanto at all just because it received sand from Monsanto.
Rather, it paid Monsanto for the processed sand SIO sold. If SIO sold no sand, it did not pay
Monsanto. 5
Consequently, the district court erred in one of two alternative ways. First, the
district court characterized the SIO/Monsanto royalty arrangement regarding sand as a contract

5

Contrary to the district court's ruling, Paloukous v. Intermountain Chev. Co., 99 Idaho
740, 588 P.2d 939 (1978), supports SIO's position, as the totality of Monsanto's obligations to
perform under its contract with SIO were, like those in Paloukous, indivisible. Reviewing the
SIG/Monsanto contract as a whole, its terms--continued presence upon Monsanto's Quarry so
long as (1) safety, environmental, and control regulations are met; (2) Monsanto may control
SIO's sales markets; and (3) Monsanto receives a royalty (rather than a price payrnent)-are
indivisible. There would.be little point for SIO to operate on the Quarry if it was not processing
and selling Monsanto's sand. To the extent Paloukous is anything other than supportive of SIO's
position, it is neutral, as it addresses the part performance exception to Idaho Code § 2-201(1),
and the evidence before the district court demonstrates that Idaho Code § 2-201 ( 1) is
inapplicable in the first place.
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for the sale of sand for $500.00 or more, even though that was not a term of the contract. The
district court also ignored evidence of other terms of the contract that had nothing to do with the
sale of any sand, such as presence upon Monsanto's Quarry, compliance with Monsanto's rules,
and deference to Monsanto's wishes regarding markets in which SIO sold processed sand. The
district court also ignored evidence of Monsanto's intent in entering into the SIO/Monsanto
contract, which was not even to make any money, but to rid itself of a waste byproduct. R. at
508. In so doing, the district court, in effect, balanced evidence regarding the intent of SIO and
Monsanto, the substance of their meeting of the minds, and the terms of their contract-all
questions of fact. See Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 185, 75 P.3d 743, 746 (2003)
("In determining the intent of the P.arties, [a court] must view the contract as a whole." (emphasis

added)); see also Shields & Co. v. Green, 100 Idaho 879, 882, 606 P.2d 983, 986 (1980)
("Generally the determination of the existence of a sufficient meeting of the minds to form a
contract is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact."). To the extent the district
court balanced evidence regarding the terms of the SIO/Monsanto contract in its analysis
regarding the statute of frauds, it improperly resolved a factual issue on summary judgment.
Second, assuming definite, unambiguous contract terms, whether a contract is
subject to the statute of frauds is a question of law. See Landes Constr. Co. v. Royal Bank of
Canada,

833 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987) ("When the material facts are not in dispute, the question of
whether a contract is within the statute of frauds is a question of law."). Here, the evidence of
the SIO/Monsanto contract's terms before the district court demonstrates, as a matter of law, that
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the SIO/Monsanto contract was not for a sale of any goods, let alone a sale of goods for $500.00
or more. Monsanto furnished sand for SIO to sell-specifically, "sufficient" sand, not particular
quantities at particular prices per quantity-and it was paid based on SIO's sale of processed
sand. Moreover, all of the other terms of the SIO/Monsanto contract-such as presence upon the
Quarry, duration, control of markets, compliance with regulations-are non-sale terms that are
inextricably intertwined with Monsanto's furnishing of sand to SIO, such that the contract, as a
whole, is plainly not a contract for the sale of goods. See Lamprecht, 139 Idaho at 185, 75 P.3d
at 746 (noting requirement to interpret contractual provisions as a whole). This Court reviews
questions oflaw without any deference to the district court's ruling. See Quick v. Crane, 111
Idaho 759, 764, 727 P.2d 1187, 1192 (1986). If the district court took the SIO/Monsanto
contract in accordance with the evidence of contract terms that SIO placed before the district
court, the district court erred in interpreting that contract or in concluding that it is subject to the
statute of frauds. This Court should lend no deference to the district court's erroneous reading of
the contract, or its application of the contract to the statute of frauds.
Either way this Court looks at it, the district court erred in granting summary
judgment in Monsanto's favor on SIO's claim for breach of contract.
2.

Having Established an Enforceable Contract, the District Court Erred by
Granting Summary Judgment on SIO's Claim for Breach of the Implied
Covenant.

The district court granted Monsanto's motion for summary judgment on SIO's
claim for breach of the implied covenant based solely on its conclusion that no enforceable
contract existed between SIO and Monsanto. R. at 789. Because the district court erroneously
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entered summary judgment against SIO on its claim for breach of contract, it likewise erred in
granting Monsanto's motion for summary judgment on SIO's claim for breach of the implied
covenant.
B.

The District Court Erred by Awarding Monsanto Summary Judgment on
SIO's Claims for Equitable Estoppel and Quasi-Estoppel.
1.

Monsanto Sought Summary Judgment on SIO's Equitable Estoppel and
Quasi-Estoppel Claims for the First Time on Reply.

Although Monsanto characterized its motion as a "Motion for Summary
Judgment," its initial memorandum did not even address SIO's claims of equitable estoppel and
quasi-estoppel, let alone articulate a basis for summary judgment on those claims. R. at 82. SIO
noted this in its memorandum in opposition and, because Monsanto did not attack those claims,
included a mere perfunctory section addressing those claims generally. R. at 384-86. Monsanto
first articulated its arguments regarding SIO's equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel claims in its
reply memorandum. R. at 734-37. The district court nevertheless awarded Monsanto summary
judgment on those claims. R. at 789-90.
It is well established that a party seeking summary judgment cannot raise new

grounds for relief in its reply memorandum. See Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, 126 Idaho 527,
531, 887 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1994) ("[I]fthe movant does not challenge an aspect of the
nonmovant's case in that party's motion, the nonmovant is not required to address it at the
summary judgment stage of the proceedings.") 6 ; see also In re Rains, 428 F.3d 893, 902 (9th Cir.

6

In Thomson, this Court rejected the notion that "when a party moves for summary
judgment on one issue, then the nonmoving party must respond to all issues and submit factual
materials on all issues, even though those 'issues' have not been asserted, because the
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2005) (finding an issue waived where it was raised for the first time in a reply brief before the
district court); McDaniel v. Miss. Baptist Med. Ctr., 869 F. Supp. 445, 453 (S.D. Miss. 1994)
(refusing to consider summary judgment arguments made for the first time in a reply
memorandum). In her partial dissent in State v Rubbermaid, Inc., 129 Idaho 353, 924 P.2d 615
(1996), Justice Trout observed as follows:
As the moving party, Rubbermaid bore the initial responsibility of determining
those issues of the State's case on which it intended to move for summary
judgment. Rubbermaid asserted three grounds in its motion for summary
judgment. Rubbermaid cannot then assert additional issues in its reply brief,
technically affording the State no opportunity to respond.
See id. at 359, 924 P.2d at 621. It is, after all, the moving party's burden to "prov[e] the absence
of a material fact," see Tingley, 125 Idaho at 89, 867 P.2d at 963, and failure to "challenge an
element" or to "present evidence establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact"
means the burden does not shift to the nonmoving party, see Smith, 128 Idaho at 719, 918 P.2d at
588.
Because Monsanto first articulated its arguments regarding SIO's equitable
estoppel and quasi-estoppel claims in its reply brief, SIO never assumed a burden to demonstrate
issues of fact regarding its equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel claims. SIO could do no more
than address its claims generally, without the benefit of knowing Monsanto's specific attacks on
each element of each claim. The district court therefore erred in awarding Monsanto summary

nonmoving party ... will have the ultimate burden of proving every element of their case at
trial." See Thomson, 126 Idaho at 531, 887 P.2d at 1038.
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judgment on those claims, and this Court should reverse the district court's determination on
those claims.
2.

The District Court Improperly Found that Hart's Representations to Todd
Sullivan Were Not False.

The district court recognized evidence in the summary judgment record that Hart
assured Sullivan, of SIO, that Monsanto "would not abruptly terminate the Monsanto Agreement
after a short period of time," or that Monsanto "would not abruptly terminate its agreement
within a few years after SIO had commenced its business." R. at 440. Nevertheless, the district
court concluded, as a matter of law, that those representations were "so general and indefinite"
that they were not misrepresentations or false representations, even if made. R. at 789-91. The
district court further found, "as a matter of law, that this representation of Mitchell J. Hart is not
a false representation." R. at 791. The district court based its grant of summary judgment on
SIO's equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel claims on this finding. R. at 791-92.
The district court's "conclusion" amounts to a finding of fact regarding the truth
or falsity of Hart's statements to Sullivan. That is improper on summary judgment. See Banner

Life Ins. Co., 147 Idaho at 127-28, 206 P.3d at 491-92 (noting prohibition against weighing
conflicting evidence and assessing credibility of witnesses); First Sec. Bank, 131 Idaho at 792,
964 P.3d at 659 (rejecting an approach where the district court made, on summary judgment, "a
credibility determination and weighed the evidence presented on the summary judgment
motions").
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If the district court's analysis is that "abrupt" termination "after a short period of

time" and termination "within a few years after SIO had commenced its business" are too vague
to constitute a representation forming the basis of estoppel claims, that is a question for a finder
of fact to make after hearing and weighing all evidence, not on summary judgment. Additional
evidence of the parties' intent, relative to the facts of SIO's business and Monsanto's
requirements, as well as the parties' understanding of Hart's representation, is relevant to a
determination of the enforceability of Hart's statement. For its part, SIO amply demonstrated in
the summary judgment record the abruptness of Monsanto's termination of its contract.
Monsanto's termination itself is indicative of that abruptness. On December 30, 2007, SIO
received a letter from WGI (not Monsanto) requiring SIO to leave the Quarry premises, even
though WGI indisputably does not own the Quarry and lacks any right to remove SIO from the
premises. R. at 585. The timing of that letter shocked SIO, as SIO and WGI had previously
scheduled a meeting for mid-January 2008 to discuss SIO's and WGI's ongoing relationship. R.
at 442. Monsanto did not formally confirm its desire that SIO depart the Quarry until nearly four
months later, in April 2008. R. at 442. Until that point, SIO's only notice was WGI's letter.
Based on these facts, a finder of fact-after hearing and weighing all evidence--could find that
Monsanto "abruptly" terminated its contract with SIO.
Moreover, whether the time between early 2000 and December 2007approximately seven years--constitutes "a short period of time" or "a few years" is also a
question of fact. To resolve that question, the district court must look at all of the circumstances
surrounding those representations, as well as evidence of the parties' intent and reasonable
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understanding at the time Hart and Monsanto made those representations. The summary
judgment record contained enough evidence to warrant a trial on that issue. Specifically, but
without limitation, on or about December 19, 2000, Bob Sullivan (of SIO) confirmed in writing
that "the intent" behind SIO's arrangement with Monsanto "seems to be a long-term
relationship." R. at 444. Neither Hart nor anyone else at Monsanto ever corrected, qualified, or
even responded to that statement. R. at 439-40. Hart himself, in his March 6, 2008, email,
confirmed that at least his understanding (as the individual that represented Monsanto vis-a-vis
SIO's operations) was that "[a]s long as the terms, conditions, and expectations were met ... the
agreements would continue to go forward in a mutually beneficial way unless there was cause
for a 'parting of the ways."' R. at 439, 445-46. He later confirmed, in his March 14, 2008,
email, that Monsanto intended to permit SIO to continue operating "so long as it was mutually
beneficial" to do so. R. at 439, 447-48. The evidence before the district court on summary
judgment was that Monsanto, like SIO, contemplated a long-term relationship-not necessarily
perpetual, as the district court stated, but giving rise to a "reasonable inference," drawn in favor
of SIO as the non-moving party, of something more than seven years. Reasonable minds can
differ on whether seven years is a "short period of time," a "few years," or something different,
based on the circumstances surrounding SIO's business.
The district court's own analysis bears this out. It explained its rationale as
follows:
SIO has taken the position that the representation was that the relationship would
continue in perpetuity as long as it was mutually beneficial. However, Mitchell J.
Hart states in his affidavit that "Monsanto had long-term arrangements in place
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with WGI to operate the silica mine." As the record also reflects these "longterm arrangements" were contracts of ten (J OJ and jive (5) years respectively.
This subjective difference in what constitutes "within a few years" just
underscores the problems with SIO's claim for Equitable Estoppel. What to
Mitchell J. Hart constitutes a "few years" is obviously something less than five (5)
years, hence his comment that Monsanto had long-term arrangements, one of
which was five (5) years, in place with WGI ....
R. at 791 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The district court's analysis ignores two things.
First, the district court conceded that Hart, also, considered a ten-year contract a long-term
contract. Termination after seven years may well be inconsistent with that. Second, the mere
fact that Hart may be able to put a number on "a few years" simply means that reasonable minds
can differ on the meaning of that term.
Regardless of the district court's characterization, a "conclusion" that Hart's
representation was not false is really nothing more than a finding of fact that the district court
cannot make on summary judgment, particularly given the evidence to the contrary in the record.
3.

The District Court Improperly Concluded that SIO Should Have Probed
Into the Falsity of SIO's Representation.

The district court also concluded that SIO should have found out more
specifically what Hart meant when he said that Monsanto would not "abruptly" terminate its
agreement within "a few years," and even sought to reduce that representation to writing. R. at
791. 7 But if the representation is subject to reliance (which, as explained above, it is), there is no

7

Critically, not even in its reply memorandum in support of its motion for summary
judgment did Monsanto argue that SIO should have exerted more effort to reduce Monsanto's
representations to greater specificity, and that SIO therefore cannot prove that it "did not know or
could not discover the truth." Rather, Monsanto argued that (1) SIO should have known that
Hart lacked authority to make binding representations; (2) SIO was aware of the expiration of the
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reason for SIO to further inquire as to whether Hart and Monsanto really mean what they say.
The inquiry on claims for equitable estoppel and quasi estoppel is not whether the promisee
should have probed more deeply to unmask a latent falsehood, but simply that a party reasonably
relied upon the representation. See Ogden v. Griffith, 149 Idaho 489, 495, 236 P.3d 1249, 1255
(2010) (elements of equitable estoppel); see also City of Eagle v. Idaho Dept. of Water Res., 150
Idaho 449, 454, 247 P.3d 1037 (2011) (elements of quasi-estoppel).
Moreover, the district court's suggestion that SIO should have reduced its
agreement to writing would, if accepted, mean that there can be no estoppel claims, which by
definition apply only when there are no legal remedies. See Iron Eagle Dev., LLC v. Quality
Design Sys., Inc., 138 Idaho 487, 492, 65 P.3d 509, 514 (2003) ("When parties enter into an

express contract, a claim based in equity is not allowed because the express contract precludes
enforcement of equitable claims."). The district court's analysis, if accepted, would swallow the
existence of the claim-if all estoppel claims can be defended on a theory that the promisee
"should have gotten it in writing," there can be no estoppel. And if "getting it in writing" results
in terms different than what Hart and Monsanto represented to SIO, an issue of fact exists as to
the falsity of Hart's and Monsanto's representations.

First and Second Quartzite Agreements and their expiration dates, and should have known that
its contract with Monsanto would not survive those agreements; (3) SIO cannot prove that
Monsanto was aware of SIO's reliance; (4) various other representations are inapposite; and (5)
Monsanto made no false representations. R. at 734-37. Monsanto does not address the element
the district court addressed, and what it did address is riddled with factual issues.

26

Client:2415863.1

In fine, this Court should reverse the district court's entry of summary judgment
in Monsanto's favor on SIO's equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel claims.

C.

The District Court Erred by Granting WGI Summary Judgment on SIO's
Claim for Tortious Interference with Contract.
1.

The District Court Erred by Entering Summary Judgment on an Argument
that WGI Did Not Make.

The district court considered "salient" the fact that "the record on summary
judgment is entirely lacking one of the key elements necessary for SIO to proceed" with its claim
for tortious interference, namely, "that WGI had no knowledge of the alleged oral contract
between SIO and Monsanto" R. at 793. Recognizing that neither party had made that argument,
the district court sua sponte raised that issue and granted summary judgment upon it. R. at 793-

94.
The district court's sua sponte grant of summary judgment was erroneous. It is
settled law that on summary judgment, "[t]he burden of proving the absence of a material fact
rests at all times upon the moving party." See Tingley, 125 Idaho at 89, 867 P.2d at 963
(emphasis added). Critically, "[i]f the moving party fails to challenge an element or fails to

present evidence establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on that element, the
burden does not shift to the nonmoving party, and the nonmoving party is not required to
respond with supporting evidence." Smith, 128 Idaho at 719, 918 P.2d at 588 (emphasis added).
It is only where the moving party successfully challenges an element of the nonmoving party's
case that the burden "shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with sufficient evidence to
create a genuine issue of fact." See id. This Court has already rejected the notion that "when a
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party moves for summary judgment on one issue, then the nonmoving party must respond to all
issues and submit factual materials on all issues, even though those 'issues' have not been
asserted, because the nonmoving party ... will have the ultimate burden of proving every
element of their case at trial." See Thomson, 126 Idaho at 531, 887 P.2d at 1038.
As the district court noted, WGI set forth no evidence that it was unaware of the
SIG/Monsanto contract. R. at 793. It therefore did not meet its burden on that element of SIO's
claim. SIG was therefore not required to put forth evidence that WGI was aware of the
SIG/Monsanto contract, and the district court erred in granting summary judgment on SIO's
claim.
In its analysis, the district court relied upon two decisions of this Court, Aardema
v. U.S. Dairy Systems, Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 215 P.3d 505 (2009), and Harwood v. Talbot, 136
Idaho 672, 39 P.3d 612 (2001), for the proposition that a district court may sua sponte raise and
dispose of issues on summary judgment that neither party briefed or argued. R. at 794. But
those decisions are so different from this case that they actually support SIO's position. In
Harwood, Harwood asserted claims against Talbert. See 136 Idaho at 674, 39 P.3d at 614.
Talbert sought summary judgment on all ofHarwood's claims. See id. at 678, 39 P.3d at 618.
The district court denied Talbert's motion and entered summary judgment in favor of Harwood,
even though Harwood had not moved for summary judgment. See id. This Court affirmed the
sua sponte grant of summary judgment on these grounds:
By challenging Harwood's entire case, Talbert made the existence of the road at
the time of the creation of the easement an issue properly before the district court.
Mason requires a notice sufficient to alert a party to present evidence to show why
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summary judgment should not be entered against him. Talbert had such notice.
The district court found that the road in question existed at the time of creation of
the easement because Talbert raised and addressed this issue in her motion for
summary judgment and supporting memorandum.
See id.

In contrast, this is not a case where SIO sought summary judgment on all claims
and issues, such that it raised and had an opportunity to address all issues, and when it became
apparent that SIO was not entitled to prevail, the district court entered summary judgment
against it. Rather, WGI sought summary judgment and did not meet its initial burden. More
critically, WGI did not provide SIO any notice of an argument that it was unaware of an
SIG/Monsanto contract. Under these circumstances, entering summary judgment sua sponte
against SIO on this sole issue violates established Idaho law requiring WGI to carry the burden
on its motion to establish entitlement to relief on all elements.
Likewise, in Aardema, Aardema sued U.S. Dairy Systems, Inc. ("U.S. Dairy")
and Westfaliasurge, Inc. ("Westfaliasurge") on various claims. See 147 Idaho at 788-89, 215
P.3d at 508--09. U.S. Dairy filed a motion for summary judgment as to Aardema's breach of
contract and breach of warranty claims, but not with respect to an economic loss issue. See id. at
792, 215 P.3d at 512. Westfaliasurge sought summary judgment on the economic loss issue,
claiming that Aardema's tort claims were barred by that rule, and that the special relationship
exception did not apply. See id. At oral argument, U.S. Dairy argued that it agreed with
Westfaliasurge's position on the special relationship exception to the economic loss rule and
orally joined Westfalisurge's motion. See id. at 792-93, 215 P.3d at 512-13. The district court
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granted summary judgment in favor of U.S. Dairy on the economic loss issue, even though it had
not sought summary judgment on that issue. See id. at 793, 215 P.3d at 513. This Court
reversed. It explained that, in contrast to certain issues that may be proven regardless of which
party brings a motion, "whether a special relationship exists is an issue that is unique to the
factual relationship between specific parties and is not one which may be addressed without the
benefit of full briefing and opportunity to reply." See id.
This case is like Aardema, but not for the reasons the district court stated.
Whether WGI was aware of the SIO/Monsanto contract is an issue that only WGI can raise; it is
not implicitly addressed in any other claim, such that SIO can brief it and respond to it. Aardema
does not address a circumstance where, as here, a moving party simply fails to articulate
entitlement to relief on each element of a claim, but the district court sua sponte articulates an
argument and grants summary judgment based on that argument, where neither party briefed or
argued that point. Contrary to the district court's interpretation, although the holding in Aardema
permits entry of summary judgment sua sponte in limited circumstances, it does not permit it
when, as here, it would conflict with accepted principles of burden on summary judgment.
The district court therefore erred in granting summary judgment in favor of WGI
on SIO's claim for tortious interference, and this Court should reverse the district court's
decision.
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2.

The Summary Judgment Record Contained Evidence that WGI Was
Aware of the SIG/Monsanto Contract.

The summary judgment record contained significant evidence that WGI was
aware of the SIG/Monsanto contract. Specifically, but without limitation, the Second
Addendum, pertaining to an agreement between WGI and Monsanto, makes clear that (1) WGI
maintains the processing plant on SIO's behalf, (2) SIG will sell the processed sand, (3) SIG will
pay royalties based on sand sold by SIO, and ( 4) title to sand will pass directly from Monsanto to
SIO upon payment of the royalty. R. at 564-68. Exhibits attached to the Second Addendum
reference SIG's payment of royalties per weight of finished sand, as well as markets into which
Monsanto has approved SIO's sale of finished sand product-terms that obviously have nothing
to do with WGL R. at 566-68. Rosenbaum, a former WGI representative, testified in his
deposition (which was a part of the record on summary judgment) that SIO paid WGI for royalty
and services, and then it passed SIG's royalty payments to Monsanto. R. at 649. He also
confirmed that, in negotiations involving SIG, Monsanto, and WGI, he did not remember
whether WGI made any royalty proposals, but he "knew" that SIO and Monsanto did. R. at 650.
Moreover, on March 7, 2002, SIO, WGI, and Monsanto agreed that the applicable
version of the Quartzite Agreement would be updated to reflect a royalty matrix consistent with
the matrix SIO had submitted. WGI would, in tum, "update [its] agreement with SIG to parallel"
the Monsanto-WGI agreement. R. at 464-66. Critically, on or about December 2, 2002,
Monsanto sent WGI a letter setting forth amounts that "represent[ ed] royalties agreed to by [SIG]
as fair and reasonable and accepted by [Monsanto]." R. at 656.
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Certainly, throughout SIO's work on the Quarry, WGI had to know that
Monsanto, not WGI, owned the property upon which SIO built its plant, and that Monsanto, not
WGI owned the sand that Monsanto furnished to SIO. WGI knew, fully, that it was passing on
an agreed-upon royalty amount to Monsanto on SIO's behalf. At the most basic level, WGI's
very role in SIO's business strongly suggests that it knew that SIO had an arrangement with
Monsanto, at least on those terms.
These facts-all of which existed in the summary judgment record--demonstrate
that Monsanto permitted SIO access to Monsanto-owned sand, permitted SIO to process and sell
that sand, and required SIO to pay Monsanto a royalty based on the amount of processed sand
that SIO sold. They also demonstrate that SIO and Monsanto agreed upon the royalty price.
Critically, WGI demonstrably knew of all of these facts; it was present during the negotiation of
at least some of the terms of the SIO/Monsanto contract. Reasonable minds could differ
regarding WGI's knowledge of the SIO/Monsanto contract, and the district court therefore erred,
on the merits, in granting summary judgment on SIO's claim for tortious interference. This
Court should reverse that detennination.
D.

The District Court Erred by Granting WGI Summary Judgment on SIO's
Claim for Breach of the Implied Covenant.

The district court concluded that SIO had not presented any evidence of damages
in support of its claim for breach of the implied covenant, and it granted summary judgment in
WGI's favor on that claim. R. at 797. The district court concluded "that there are genuine issues
of material fact which preclude summary judgment as it relates to each of WGI's arguments for

32

Client:2415863.1

summary judgment," except for the issue of damages. R. at 795. In other words, the district
court concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate on the issue of the existence of the
implied covenant, as well as breach.
SIO's discovery responses demonstrate its damages, at least in part. There, SIO
explained that, on a prior project, WGI had built a wash screen for another entity by simply and
inexpensively modifying an existing screen. R. at 703-05. When SIO approached WGI to
request that it build a screen in the same manner, WGI refused, but ultimately relented and
commenced building a screen that cost between $125,000 and $150,000-amounts that SIO did
not, and otherwise would not, have had to pay. R. at 703-05. In other words, SIO's argument is
that WGI undertook a project and then ran up the cost at a rate of almost 100%. The Master
Agreement expressly contemplated that type of damage, as it required WGI to take charge of
"procurement of supplies for, and construction of," SIO's facility, as well as "installation,
operation, and maintenance of [SIO's] equipment." R. at 450-52. SIO had to procure the
screen with WGI's cooperation, and WGI took advantage of that, resulting in damages of
between $125,000 and $150,000. This is sufficient to survive summary judgment on the issue of
damages. See Gillingham Constr., Inc. v. Newby-Wiggins Constr., Inc., 142 Idaho 15, 26, 121
P.3d 957 (2005) ("Damages need not be proved with mathematical exactitude."); see also

Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., 143 Idaho 733, 740, 152 P.3d 604 (2007) (damages must be
proven with "reasonable certainty").
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The district court therefore erred in granting WGI's motion for summary
judgment on SI O's claim for breach of the implied covenant, and this Court should reverse that
determination.
E.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion by Excluding Hart's March 14,
2008, Email.

The district court excluded Hart's March 14, 2008, email on the ground that it is hearsay
not subject to any exception, specifically, Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(24 ). R. at 781-86.
Specifically, the district court held that the March 14, 2008, email was not "more probative on
the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts," and that because "[b ]oth of the parties involved in this email
exchange are available ... both of their testimonies can reasonably be procured." R. at 783.
The Idaho Rules of Evidence contain a residual exception to the hearsay rule.
That exception permits the admission of:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but
having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the
general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence.
See I.R.E. 803(24).

Hart's March 14, 2008, email satisfies those criteria. The Idaho Court of Appeals,
citing the United States Supreme Court, has noted that "the spontaneity of the statement, the
consistency of repetition, the mental state of the declarant and the lack of motive to fabricate" are
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nonexclusive "indicators of trustworthiness." See State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 792, 932 P.2d
907, 915 (Ct. App. 1997). Hart wrote the March 14, 2008, email as the culmination of a series of
three emails that he wrote to Sullivan, all of which are consistent in identifying a contract
between SIO and Monsanto. Hart spent two days formulating his January 17, 2008, email, and
his March 6, 2008, email represent some "push back" against Sullivan's request for written
confirmation of Hart's understanding. The content of the March 14, 2008, email is indisputably
correct.
Moreover, and critically, Hart admits sending all three emails, including the
March 14 2008, email, to Todd Sullivan, and in his deposition, he extensively verified the
content of the emails that SIO has offered in opposition to the pending motions for summary
judgment. R. at 510-16. Sullivan confirms receiving those emails in the very same format that
Hart admits sending them. R. at 438-40. There is no dispute whatsoever that the emails that
SIO has proffered are true and correct copies of the very emails that Hart sent, and which
Sullivan received.
Furthermore, the March 14, 2008, email bears on a fact that is enormously
material to this action: the existence of a contract between SIO and Monsanto. In this case,
which encompasses proof of an oral contract between SIO and Monsanto, those emails are
critically probative; if they are not the most probative evidence available to SIO, they are close.
The fact that Hart (and Sullivan) are available to testify is immaterial. While Hart
can testify as to what he now understands the SIO/Monsanto contract to have been, his emails in
early 2008-including the March 14, 2008, email-are the best evidence of what he understood
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that contract to be independent of this lawsuit. Put differently, it is relevant that Hart understood
the SIO/Monsanto contract in the way that he did on March 14, 2008. It is no less relevant now
that Hart has attempted to subsequently soften the content of his email.
Contrary to the district court's ruling, SIO does not seek to use Hart's March 14,
2008, email for impeachment. Rather, it is substantive evidence-indeed, solid substantive
evidence--of an agreement between SIO and Monsanto, as well as the terms of that agreement.
The exclusion of the March 14, 2008, email prejudices SIO's substantive rights.
As Section A of this brief demonstrates, an issue before the Court is the nature of the
SIO/Monsanto agreement, specifically, whether it was a mere contract for the sale of good for
$500 or more, or whether it was a broader and more unique agreement that involved not payment
for goods, but a royalty for sand sold that, in the words of the March 14, 2008, email, "would
more than offset any costs Monsanto might incur from [SIO's] operation." R. at 439, 447-48.
The Idaho Rules of Evidence "shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and
development of the law of evidence, to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined." See I.R.E. 102. In particular, "[t]he principal purpose underlying the policy
behind the hearsay rule is" simply "to assure that testimony of assertions shall be subjected to
cross-examination." See State v. McPhie, 104 Idaho 652, 655, 662 P.2d 233, 236 (1983). The
March 14, 2008, email constitutes necessary evidence that, if considered, further demonstrates
this Court's need to reverse the district court's decision. The district court therefore abused its
discretion in declining to consider the March 14, 2008, email.

36

Client: 2415863. 1

VI.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's awards of summary judgment to
Monsanto and WGI should be reversed, the district court's awards of attorney fees and costs to
Monsanto should be vacated, and this case should be remanded to the district court for further
proceedings, including trial.
DATED this

Z~ay of April, 2012.
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